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1. Introduction 
This paper presents developments in the water sector in Europe in three sections. 
 
 Firstly, it offers a summary overview of some developments which may be significant trends 
 Secondly, it analyses the major changes which have taken place in the ownership of the major 
private sector water companies since the beginning of 2006.  
 Thirdly, it looks at some of the events and developments in different European countries and regions. 
 
 While it attempts to identify all major events, it is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of developments 
in the water sector in all European countries. 
 
This version of the paper is a draft for discussion at the Reclaiming Public Water meeting in January 2008. A 
final version will be published and circulated following that meeting. 
2. Issues and trends 
2.1. Public sector and private equity ownership 
 There is a trend away from multi-utility multinationals and/or stock exchange quoted companies 
towards increased ownership by the state or by private equity.  
 There are now very few major private water companies which are part of larger multinational 
groups, following the successive sales of Veolia, SAUR, RWE and (soon) Suez: FCC/Aqualia is the 
main remaining example.  
 Some companies remain quoted on the stock exchange, including Veolia and Suez, but the French 
state fund CDC is becoming the most important owner of shares in the major French water 
companies.  
 Most English water companies are now owned by private equity funds, making heavy use of debt 
financing. 
2.2. Use of public sector finance for investment 
Water systems make heavy use of EU or national public sector finance mechanisms, even where private 
companies are involved. This can be seen across Europe: 
 the UK making heavy use of EIB loans for PPPs;  
 French affermage contracts where responsibility for investment lies with public finance mechanism 
including the agences d‟eau;  
 government finance for investment in water systems eg in Germany and Hungary;  
 the reliance on EU cohesion funds for water investment in new member states;  
 the „sweetheart‟ support for Veolia from the EBRD.    
2.3. Illegal behaviour by private companies 
Illegal behaviour by private companies has been observed  
 in England (where 4 companies have been prosecuted, fined and/or forced to make repayments for 
giving incorrect information to the regulator) and  
 in Italy (where Acea and Suez have been fined for anti-competitive behaviour).   
2.4. Resistance to privatisation and pro-public initiatives  
Resistance to water privatisation remains strong across Europe. 
 In Italy, a 1-year moratorium on water privatisation has been introduced by parliament, while the 
draft law to make water privatisation illegal continues its progress.  
 The mayor of Paris has stated that the water distribution services of Paris will be remunicpalised in 
2009 when the existing concessions expire. 
 The water service in Elber, Albania was remunicipalised in 2006 
 There has been a strong and successful campaign against water privatisation in Northern Ireland. 
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2.5. Commercialisation of public operations  
The commercialisation of public operations appears to be increasing.  
 
This can take the form of public water companies introducing market-based instruments in the delivery of in-
house operations, often as a result of municipal shareholders‟ initiatives or changes in the legal and 
regulatory framework. 
  
 Stockholm‟s new municipal government have recently announced that the municipal water operator 
Stockholm Vatten would change policy to focus on short term, “demand-driven” maintenance. This 
is likely to lead to neglect of the long term development of the system.  
 
 Wholly publicly-owned Scottish Water has introduced a number of PPPs for the delivery of its 
capital investment programme. Under the UK government‟s Private Finance Initiative, BOT 
contracts have been awarded to private consortia for the construction and operation of wastewater 
treatment plants. Subsequently, public-private joint ventures called “Scottish Water Solutions” have 
been established that would be responsible for the delivery of 70% of Scottish Water‟s capital 
investment programme. An act passed in 2005 by the Scottish devolved parliament provided for the 
introduction of retail competition for Scottish Water‟s 150,000 business customers. The Scottish 
executive was also committed to reducing cross-subsidies between commercial and domestic water 
consumers.     
 
Commercialisation also takes the form of public water operators engaging in commercial operations outside 
their in-house base, for example by bidding for contracts domestically or internationally, and buying shares 
in private water companies. 
 
 Turin‟s in-house water provider SMAT bought 44% of private water company Società Acque 
Potabili (SAP) in 2005 and is using SAP as a vehicle for expansion in Italy and abroad, particularly 
in the Mediterranean and China. In 2007, SAP‟s subsidiary APS won a 30-year contract for 
managing water supply and sanitation services in the Palermo region, Sicily (1.2 million 
inhabitants). According to Palermo‟s municipal operator AMAP, one year after the award APS had 
reduced investments by Euro 31.9 million out of  a Euro 145.6 million projected investment 
programme.   
 Sevilla‟s municipally owned PLC EMASESA provides water supply and sanitation services in-house 
to 1 million inhabitants. “To fully benefit and make use of their technical and human resources, 
EMASESA have decided to expand the activity to other markets”, domestically and internationally. 
Target domestic markets encompass the whole of Spain while international expansion efforts would 
focus on Latin America, Eastern Europe and Mediterranean countries. EMASESA‟s objectives 
include participation in “international cooperation programs and governmental agreements (national, 
regional and municipal Administrations) with public institutions of Latin America and other 
geographical areas”. It should be noted that EMASESA‟s Board of Directors includes 
representatives of trade unions and civil society organisations.   
2.6. Upward pressure on prices: WFD, corporatisation 
A number of factors are increasing the price of water to households.  
 
 The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is being used by the EU and governments to increase prices 
for households, in the name of cost recovery.  Prices rise to compensate for reductions in state 
subsidies, and cost recovery policies are more advanced for households than for industry or 
agriculture.   
 Corporatisation may involve the creation of a new element of „equity‟ capital, which then requires 
servicing with dividends, as well as creating new transaction costs (as in Northern Ireland). The 
reduction of central government support to local authorities may be the major driver of 
commercialisation of the service which maximises profits to replace lost government revenue (as in 
Finland)  
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
09/07/2010  Page 5 of 23  
  
2.7. Bottled water campaigns 
There are major campaigns against bottled water currently running in France, led by a number of councils 
committed to public water services e.g. Paris, and in the USA, where there have been congressional hearings 
on the subject in 2007.  In the UK the tap water supplied by Thames Water was rated higher than all but two 
of 20 bottled waters in a blind tasting.  
3. Private companies 
3.1. Ownership 
The great majority of European water operators remain in public ownership. Amongst those which have been 
or remain privately owned, there is no consistent pattern of ownership emerging to replace the 
multinationals. In some cases public authorities have re-purchased ownership of the water companies (the 
state in the case of SAUR in France and Elber in Albania, municipalities in the case of Gelsenwasser in 
Germany); in other cases, especially in England, private equity funds have bought companies; in a few cases 
local companies have purchased shareholdings from the multinationals (e.g. GW-Borsodvíz in Hungary); in 
some cases shares are being sold to the public (e.g. Tallinn).  
 
Groups dominated by non-water business have sold their water interests completely, including Bouygues, 
E.on, and RWE (largely). Suez and Veolia, the two largest water companies, have effectively experienced 
the same process, with the water and waste operations discarded by their own overgrown children. Veolia 
Environnement was floated  as a water and waste management company in 2002 by Vivendi, the media 
multinational which had itself originally grown out of the water and waste business of Generale des Eaux.   
In 2007, Suez, which originally grew out of the French water company Lyonnaise des Eaux, confirmed its 
plans to merge with GDF to form a large energy group. Suez Environnement will be floated off on the stock 
exchange as a separate water and waste company, with all shares initially held by Suez/GdF shareholders. 
 
The exception is the Spanish group FCC, which has expanded both inside and outside Spain through its 
subsidiary Aqualia (and, to a smaller extent, the Spanish construction group Sacyr Vallehermosa, which 
operates on both Spain and Portugal – and Brazil – through its Valoriza division). 
 
The net result of these ownership changes and the tendency for companies to withdraw from international 
activities is that there are now only 7 companies which operate water services in more than one EU country. 
Table 1.  Water companies active in more than one country in EU 
Group Home 
country  
Growth 
prospect 
Countries (water operations only) 
Suez  FR = Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, UK 
Veolia  FR + Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, 
Slovakia, UK,  
SAUR FR - France, Spain, Poland 
FCC/Aqualia ES + Spain, Czech republic, Italy, Portugal 
Sacyr Vallehermosa/Valoriza ES = Spain, Portugal 
United Utilities UK - UK, Estonia, Bulgaria, Poland 
Gelsenwasser  DE - Germany, Hungary, Poland 
 
The main ownership trends amongst the largest companies are set out below, together with brief profiles on 
the largest companies active in Europe. 
Table 2.  Multinational groups sell water interests 
Water company Home 
country 
Former 
parent 
Former parent 
main sector 
Date 
sold 
Sale 
method 
Current main 
shareholder 
% New owner type 
Suez Env. France Suez/GDF Energy 2008 IPO CDC/state 35(est.) State/state fund 
Veolia Env. France Vivendi Media 2002 IPO CDC+EDF 14 State fund 
SAUR France Bouygues* Construction 2005 Sale CDC 40 State fund 
Thames Water UK RWE Energy 2006 Sale Macquarie 100 Private equity 
Gelsenwasser Germany E.on Energy 2003 Sale Bochum/ 
Dortmund 
100 Municipality 
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3.2. French companies and state holdings 
In April 2007 PAI sold SAUR to a consortium led by the French state bank Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations (CDC), which holds over 40% of the shares. In effect, SAUR has been partially nationalized. 
This was done in order to prevent a foreign private equity takeover of the French operations: 
“The  consortium's offer was chosen not only because it was the best, but also because it will allow the 
water  distribution company to remain French-owned.” 1  This is part of a more general bi-partisan French 
strategy to “create a state capitalism actively ensuring local French control of major private companies…the 
priority sectors are infrastructure, property and healthcare”. 2    
 
CDC and the French state are now also the main shareholders in both Suez and Veolia. CDC already owns 
10% of  Veolia, with another 4% owned by the French electricity company EDF, which is itself still 70% 
owned by the French state.  The plans for Suez  Environnement would also mean that the state and CDC 
together would hold about 17% . 
 
A recent comparison of Suez Environnement and Veolia found that both companies have a return on capital 
of around 11%, but that Veolia has a much larger debt,  partly due to continued expansion, even in 
developing countries, and partly due to the debts of Vivendi being dumped on the company when it was spun 
off (“il traîne une dette colossale, 15,6 milliards d'euros, y compris  l'héritage laissé par Vivendi 
Universal.”)3  
 
Table 3.  France: Water Company ownership, December 2007 
(Type of owner: State= state; SE = stock exchange quoted; PE=private equity) 
Company Type of owner Comments 
Suez Environnement SE/state 35% owned via state/CDC shareholdings. From some time in 2008. 
Veolia Environnement SE/state 14% owned by CDC + EDF 
SAUR PE/state Largest stake (47%) held by CDC 
 
3.2.1. Suez 
Suez remains one of the two dominant companies in France, Europe and the world. France accounts for 48% 
of its water business in Europe. Beyond France, it retains its significant presence in Spain, through Aguas de 
Barcelona and its subsidiaries; in Germany, Czech republic, Hungary and Slovakia, through concessions 
established in the 1990s; in Italy, partly in partnership with Acea; and in the UK, where Suez sold its 
remaining shares in Northumbrian water in 2004, but re-entered the country through Agbar‟s purchase of 
Bristol water in 2006.   
 
In 2007 Suez, together with la Caixa, bought up a majority of the shares in Aguas de Barcelona (Suez had 
previously held  a dominant stake in AgBar), and by November 2007 the two companies had obtained 56% 
of AgBar‟s shares. 4  Suez has already transferred its only remaining South American operations (Santiago, 
Cartagena) to AgBar,  used AgBar to buy a UK company (Bristol), and allowed AgBar to expand in South 
Korea. This might be a way of channelling all the remaining non-French water into Agbar, so that a French 
entity could take over the French interests, and then a private equity buyer - or a big Spanish company - can 
buy Agbar and everything else.  However Suez has also bought the 33% stake in Aguas de Valencia which 
was sold by SAUR, apparently to prevent Veolia buying it. 5  
 
Table 4.  Suez subsidiaries in water in Europe 
Country Company  % owned Website Employees 
Czech Republic Ostrava VaK 44.5  www.ovak.cz 450 
Czech Republic SPVS 82  www.spvs.cz 200 
Czech Republic VAK Brno 46  www.bvk.cz 593 
Czech Republic VaK Karlovy Vary 49.8  www.vakkv.cz 523 
Czech Republic VAS Brno 33.4  www.vastd.cz 1200 
Czech Republic VHS Benesov 100  www.vhs-sro.cz 160 
France Lyonnaise des Eaux France 100  www.lyonnaise-des-eaux.fr 8341 
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Germany Eurawasser 100  www.eurawasser.de 500 
Hungary Budapest Water 12.5   1511 
Hungary Eaux de Kaposvar 35    
Hungary Pecsi Vizmu 48    
Italy Acea 9.9  www.aceaspa.it 5517 
Italy Acque SpA 5.4   www.acque.net  
Italy Acque Toscane  70  www.acquetoscane.it  
Italy Acquedotto del Fiora 40   www.fiora.it  
Italy Nuove Acque 23   www.nuoveacque.it 200 
Italy Publiacqua 40   www.publiacqua.it 635 
Slovakia Trencianska spolocnost, TVS 51  www.tvs.sk  
Spain Aguas de Barcelona 28  www.agbar.es 35772  
Spain Aguas de Valencia 33    
UK Bristol Water 100  www.bristolwater.co.uk 399 
 
3.2.2. Veolia 
Veolia is the only group which states that it plans to actively expand its water operations, worldwide. It has 
gained new contracts in the Czech republic, and its first contracts in Slovakia, in Banska Bystrica and 
Poprad. In practice, however, much of this expansion takes the form of BOT or management contracts: for 
example it has a presence in the Netherlands, but only as operator of a BOT wastewater treatment plant in 
Rotterdam; its new operations in Denmark, Ireland and Romania are also for treatment plants. Veolia‟s 
presence in the UK consists of three water-only companies which it has held for about 10 years: it has sold 
its stake in Southern Water.  Veolia left Spain when it sold its interest in FCC, but retains a 50% stake in 
Proactiva, a joint venture with FCC for water and waste operations in Latin America..  
 
Veolia is actively seeking expansion in Hungary, Armenia, and Russia, where it has formed a joint venture, 
Eurasian Water partnership, with Russian groups. Outside Europe, all its new contracts are for treatment 
plants or management contracts, even in China.  
 
Veolia consists of water, waste, heating and public transport operations. It therefore has little option but to 
continue operating in these sectors, as it has no other core business, such as energy, to retreat to. Given that 
private equity companies are interested in both water and waste, Veolia itself may be a target for private 
equity bids. As with SAUR, and probably Suez, there would no doubt be an initiative to ensure that the 
French water operations remained in French hands: the state-owned CDC is already one of the two leading 
shareholders in Veolia. 
Table 5.  Veolia subsidiaries in water in Europe 
Country Company Owns% Website Employees 
Czech Republic 1. JVS 50 www.1jvs.cz 451 
Czech Republic Aqua Pribram 100 www.aqua-pb.cz 150 
Czech Republic PVK 100 www.pvk.cz 1846 
Czech Republic SCVK 49.6 www.scvk.cz 2294 
Czech Republic Středomoravská Vodárenská 50  www.smv.cz 279 
Czech Republic Vodarna Plzen 49.2  www.vodarna.cz 420 
Czech Republic Vodarny Kladno-Melnik (VKM) 71.5 www.vkm.cz  
Czech Republic VOSS Sokolov 50 www.voss.cz 189 
Czech Republic Prostejov    
Czech republic Slany    
France Generale des Eaux 100   
Germany MIDEWA 25.1 www.midewa.de  
Germany Stadtwerke Görlitz 74.9 www.stadtwerke-goerlitz.de 420 
Germany Berlinwasser 24.9  www.berlinwasser.de 6506 
Hungary FCSM Budapest 12.5  www.fcsmrt.hu  
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Hungary Szeged Waterworks 49 www.szegedivizmu.hu  
Italy Acqualatina 22    
Italy Genova Acque 20  www.amgaspa.it/servizi/genova_acque.html  
Italy SIBA 50   
Italy Siciliacque 19   140 
Poland PWiK Tarnowskie Gory 33.85   
Romania Apa Nova Bucuresti 83.69   
Romania Apa Nova Ploiesti 80 www.apanova-ploiesti.ro 380 
Slovakia Banska Bystrica    
Slovakia Poprad    
UK Folkestone and Dover 100   
UK Three Valleys Water 100 www.3valleys.co.uk 1046 
UK Tendring Hundred  100   
 
3.2.2. SAUR 
SAUR was for many years owned by the construction company Bouygues (for a period EdF also held a 
significant stake)  and then sold the majority of SAUR‟s operations to PAI Partners in a “leveraged 
acquisition”, except for the African and Italian operations, which remain owned by Bouygues.   
 
In April 2007 PAI sold SAUR to a consortium led by French public finance institution Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations (CDC), with 47%, joined by French waste management and waste transport specialist Seche 
Environnement (33 per cent) and infrastructure investment vehicle AXA IM (20 per cent). SAUR had been 
the subject of a bid by Macquarie, but France's Association of Mayors expressed serious reservations at the 
prospect of a foreign bank managing public sector concessions.6  
 
In Poland, SAUR owns 51% of SAUR-Neptun-Gdansk, the other 49% being owned by the city council. Its 
other major European holding was a 33% stake in Aguas de Valencia, but it sold this to Suez in 2007.  
SAUR still owns in Spain 33% of Emalsa, the water company for Las Palmas in the Canary Islands: it 
bought this stake in September 2005, when another 33% was also bought by Valoriza. 
Table 6.  SAUR water operations in Europe 
Country Company Sector % owned Website Employees 
France SAUR water 100 www.saur.fr    6100 (2004) 
Poland SAUR-Neptun-Gdansk Water 51 www.sng.com.pl    700 (2002) 
Spain Emalsa Water 33 www.emalsa.es   347(2002) 
 
3.3. UK companies and private equity 
The ownership of  the privatized water companies in England and Wales shows a major growth in the role of 
financial and private equity investors. Four of the 10 large water and sewerage companies – Anglian, 
Southern, Thames and Yorkshire - were owned by private equity or financial groups by the end of 2007. 
Four others are still quoted on the stock exchange: of these, Northumbrian is 45% owned by three financial 
investors; Pennon Group, owners of South-West Water, has 30% of its shares owned by 5 major financial 
shareholders, including Axa (5%) - who are also in the consortium buying SAUR in France - and Ameriprise 
(7.5%).  Only one is now owned by a multinational group - Wessex, owned by Malaysian company YTL; 
and one is a not for profit company (Glas Cymru).  Of the smaller water only companies, three are still 
owned by Veolia, one is now owned by Suez/Agbar, one by a Hong Kong group, one by a private UK group 
(Biwater), and the rest are owned by private equity. 
Table 7.  UK: Water Company ownership, December 2007 
(Types: State= state; SE = stock exchange quoted; M = multinational; PE=private equity; NPC=not-for-profit company; 
P= privately owned company) 
Company Principal owner Country Type  Comments 
Anglian Water Osprey/AWG UK PE Consortium of 3 PE funds, inc. 3i 
Northumbrian Water  UK SEC 25% owned by Ontario Teachers Pension Fund, 
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15% by fund managers Amvescap, 5% by 
Barclays Bank 
North West Water United Utilities UK SEC  
Severn Trent Water Severn Trent UK SEC  
Southern Water Greensands UK PE Main partners are JP Morgan and Challenger. 
Bought October 2007 
South West Water Pennon Group UK SEC Pennon is 30% owned by 5 financial investors 
Thames Water Macquarie Australia PE  
Welsh Water Glas Cymru UK NPC  
Wessex Water YTL Malaysia M  
Yorkshire Water Citigroup/HSBC UK PE Bought November 2007 
     
Bournemouth and West 
Hampshire Water 
Biwater UK P Private company, operates internationally, but 
not in EU outside UK. 
Bristol Water Agbar/Suez ES/FR M  
Cambridge Water Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure 
Hong Kong M  
Cholderton Water Cholderton Estate UK P Private family owned 
Dee Valley - UK SEC 35% of shares owned by Axa SA. 
Folkestone and Dover  Veolia FR M  
Mid Kent Water UTA and HDF Australia PE Utilities Trust of Australia (UTA); Hastings 
Diversified Utilities Fund (HDF). Bought Swan 
Group, the holding company of Mid Kent Water. 
Swan also owns 51% of Halcrow water Services. 
Portsmouth Water South Downs Capital UK PE South Downs Capital  is 36% owned by 
SMIF/Land Securities (PE). SMIF=Secondary 
Market Infrastructure Fund. SMIF itself was 
bought by Star Fund (PE) in 2003, sold in 2006 
to Land Securities (PE) 
South East Water UTA and HDF Australia PE Macquarie bought South East Water from SAUR 
in 2003; sold it to UTA/HFM in October 2006, 
prior to o purchase of Thames Water. 
South Staffordshire 
Water 
Alinda Capital 
Partners 
USA PE Bought in 2007 from from Arcapita (Bahrein) 
Sutton & East Surrey 
Water 
Aqueduct Capital DE PE Aqueduct Capital is part of Deutsche Bank. 
Bought holding company  East Surrey Holdings 
Group (ESH) for £189m in 2006  from Kellen 
Acquisitions Ltd – part of Terra Firma. Kellen 
had bought ESH only in October 2005, and then 
sold off gas companies. 
Tendring Hundred Veolia FR M  
Three Valleys Veolia FR M  
 
The English and Welsh companies have been withdrawing shareholder equity capital and replacing it with 
debt finance. The gearing of the water companies – the percentage of capital financed by debt - has risen 
from an average of 0% to an average of 60%, with a number of companies having gearings over 75%.  Thus 
instead of shareholders putting money into the industry, there has been a significant withdrawal of 
shareholder equity from the water companies.  This represents a return to the same form of finance used by 
public sector water operators – indeed, a significant part of the borrowing has been from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), a public sector bank owned by the European Union which is able to lend at very 
good rates. In addition, some of the companies are now using long-term index-linked bonds, where the 
interest is fixed at a small real amount plus the rate of inflation. Normally only governments use this kind of 
bond, because they are prepared to take the risk of inflation, but utility companies can do so if their prices are 
effectively linked to inflation by a public regulator: then the risk is carried by users (or the government). 
Macquarie for example is refinancing Thames Water through , and in August 2007 announced it was issuing 
£900 million index-linked bonds through a Cayman Islands subsidiary. 7  
3.3.1. United Utilities 
The new financial structure of United Utilities (UU), as reported in November 2007, illustrates these trends. 8   
1 UU is replacing shareholder‟s equity with debt, by returning over £450m. to shareholders in 2007 
and replacing it with more debt. This increases the proportion of its business financed by debt: “We 
are aiming for a more efficient capital structure with a gearing target towards the upper end of 
Ofwat‟s 55 per cent to 65 per cent range.”   
2 UU has now issued around £1.5 billion of index-linked debt, about 27% of its total debt.  The latest 
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such bond has a maturity of 30 years and pays 1.66% interest over inflation. Although the total cost 
of these bonds increases if inflation rises, the company‟s “allowed revenues are also linked” to 
inflation under the regulatory regime, and so the risk of inflation is effectively removed from the 
company and carried by the users instead.  
3 UU has a total of £613.1m loans from the EIB, which represents 12% of all UU‟s debt finance. 
About a third of this EIB debt is also index-linked.  
Chart A. Bonds, index-linked bonds and EIB financing of UU debt 2007 
Elements of United Utilities  £5.502 billion debt Sept 2007
EIB index-linked 
loans, 200 EIB other loans, 
413.1
GBP index-linked 
bonds, 1263.7
GBP bonds, 766.7
Euro bonds (EUR), 
1435.1
Yankee bonds 
(USD), 720.7
Other bonds, 87.5
Other debt, 615.8
 
Source: United Utilities PLC Half yearly financial report Six months ended 30 September 2007 
3.4. FCC/Aqualia (Spain) 
FCC is a long-established Spanish construction, urban services, and cement group. For a few years it became 
de facto controlled by Veolia, but Veolia sold its shares in FCC in 2004. The environmental services division 
includes waste management and water. It expanded by acquisition in 2006, with major purchases including 
Austrian waste company ASA, UK waste company WRG, and Czech water company SMVAK.  It is also 
active in other infrastructure operations, including roads and motorways and airports.  
Aqualia is the water company in the environmental services division of FCC. In Spain it employs over 4400 
employees , on contracts covering 900,000 inhabitants in  Almería, Ávila,Badajoz, Jaén, Lleida, Oviedo, 
Puerto de la Cruz (Tenerife), and Salamanca. All the other European water operations of FCC were acquired 
in 2006. The largest was the purchase by FCC of the Czech water company Severomoravské Vodovody a 
Kanalizace Ostrava (SmVaK), the third largest in the Czech Republic, serving 737,000 people. SmVaK has 
changed ownership a number of times since the 1990s, with shares held by Anglian Water, then Suez, then 
by the Slovak private equity group Pentra, and then FCC.9 SmVaK has expanded within the Czech republic 
by taking over services for more municipalities, but it does not have any subsidiaries or operating contracts 
outside the Czech republic. In January 2006, FCC won a 30 year concession covering 275,000 people in the 
22 municipalities in the Sicilian province of Caltanissetta (Italy), in a joint venture with local contractors. It 
“includes investing over 248 million euro, mostly from European funds, 150 million euro of which will be 
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invested in the next three years.” 10  It also won a 40 year contract at La Lezíria del Tajo in Portugal. 
Beyond Europe, FCC  operates in water and waste through Proactiva, a 50-50 joint venture with Veolia. 
Proactiva has private water operations in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia. The future of these contracts is 
uncertain. In Algeria FCC has contracts for the Mostaganem and Cap Djinet desalination plants. 
 
4. Privatisation and commercialisation 
4.1. Privatisation drive in Portugal 
State owned Aguas de Portugal is in the process of privatising its subsidiary Aquapor, which is responsible 
for providing water services to 345,000 consumers in 24 municipalities. Aquapor is being privatised through 
the sale of its entire capital. At the same time, the Portuguese government has provided for the privatisation 
of Aguas de Portugal through listing on the stock exchange.  
 
Furthermore, Spanish private operator Sacyr Vallehermoso owns 100% of Administración y Gestión de 
Sistemas de Salubridade (AGS), which claims to hold 40% of the private water market in Portugal. Finally, 
FCC/Aqualia holds a 40 year contract at La Lezíria del Tajo.  
 
4.2. Corporatisation in northern Europe 
4.2.1. Gelsenwasser (Germany) 
Gelsenwasser is owned by the stadtwerke of the municipalities of the cities of Bochum and Dortmund, which 
bought the company from E.on in 2003. It provides water,wastewater and gas services to a number of 
municipalities in Germany.  At the end of 2007 the stadtwerke were discussing the possibility of merging 
with Gelsenwasser, which would create a single municipal company with annual sales of about €1.5 billion. 
11   RWE owns 47% of the Dortmund stadtwerke, Dortmunder Energie und Wasser (DEW21). 
 
Gelsenwasser has expanded into eastern Europe, but it sold its shares in the Hungarian company GW-
Borsodvíz Kft in 2005 to a local Hungarian company. It still owns shares in water companies in the Czech 
republic - 30.58% of Chevak Cheb; 50% of Terea Cheb; and 50% of  KMS Kraslicka Mestska Spolecnost. In 
Poland, it owns 46% of PWiK Glogow.  
 
In 2007 it was reported that Gelsenwasser had bought an unspecified stake in a small French water services 
company, Nantaise des Eaux Services. According to Les Echos, Nantaise des Eaux supplies 300,000 
customers, has 170 employees, and annual sales of  €15.6million.  About half the business of the Nantaise 
des Eaux group is engineering. 12  
Table 8.  Gelsenwasser: subsidiaries in water in Europe 
Country Company % owned Website Empl
oyees 
Czech Republic Chevak Cheb 30.58 www.chevak.cz 243 
Czech Republic Terea Cheb 50% www.terea-cheb.cz 116 
Czech republic KMS Kraslicka Mestska Spolecnost 50%   
France Nantaise des Eaux Services  www.nantaise-des-eaux.com  170 
Germany Gelsenwasser 100%  www.gelsenwasser.de 1277 
Poland PWiK Glogow 46%   www.pwik.glogow.pl 175 
 
4.2.2. Finland 
A recent study of water services in Finland identifies the central government‟s withdrawal of finance from 
local authorities as a key reason why local water companies have become more commercial. The 
municipalities have responded to the government cuts by setting the water operators short-term financial  
objectives to attract resources to replace those withdrawn by central government:  
“the Finnish state has been continuously decreasing financial support for municipalities while and 
the same time encouraging them to adopt private sector practices and to intensify inter-municipal 
operation. In this still ongoing reform process, the municipalities have significant freedom in how to 
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implement reforms, which allows them to find their own ways of organizing. Municipalities have 
become more entrepreneurial by embracing private sector managerialism and by adopting a more 
active role in attracting national and global resource flows to their local areas. Since the state‟s role 
as financier is decreasing, municipalities are increasingly turning to investment bankers and financial 
consultants for advice on how to secure financial resources for their budgets. Thinking mostly in 
financial terms, the financial actor‟s advice has a reinforcing effect on municipalities‟ inherent 
individualism and new entrepreneurialism. Municipalities are commercializing their public services 
operations and their self-reform is leaning toward short-term financially-oriented local solutions” 13  
 
4.3. Business as usual in new member states, eastern and south east Europe  
4.3.1. New member states  
In Bulgaria, Sofia water utility Sofiyska Voda says that it plans to invest 415 million levs (€211.9 million 
euro) from 2009 to 2013 to upgrade the water and sewage infrastructure. Over a quarter of this (114.6 
million levs) will come from EU accession funds, and it expects to raise a further 50 million levs from 
external sources, presumably private. By implication, the rest will be raised by increasing water prices in 
Sofia. 14   Sofiyska Voda is 57.8% owned by United Utilities and the EBRD. 
 
In Estonia, Tallin-based Tallina Vesi is now floated on the Estonian stock exchange. United Utilities have 
reduced their stake in Tallina Vesi to 26.5%.  The company is profitable. The municipality has complained 
of excessive price demands and “a backlog in the construction of the sewerage network”. 15   
 
In Romania, Veolia planned in 2004 to cut 250 staff  in Apa Nova because of “a trend of declining volume in 
water consumption”. In fact it has exceeded this: 331 staff were cut in 2005 and 2006. 16  Veolia‟s new 
operations in Romania consist of BOT contracts for treatment plants. Berlinwasser also has projects in 
Romania. 
 
Veolia has also gained its first contracts in Slovakia, in Banska Bystrica and Poprad. 
 
4.3.2. Russia, Ukraine, Georgia etc 
In November 2007, the EBRD has announced it would invest up to €105 million for a 10% stake in Veolia‟s 
subsidiary Veolia Voda, aiming to boost private sector participation in water supply and sanitation in Eastern 
Europe and specifically in Russia and Ukraine. 
 
In October 2007, Swiss company Multiplex Solutions took over the water operator for Georgia‟s capital city, 
Tbilisi Water, for USD 85.66 million. Multiplex Solutions had no expertise in the water sector and would 
contract an operator to manage the system. Multiplex Solutions did not put forward the highest offer but was 
selected after it had pledged to further invest USD 350 million in infrastructure rehabilitation. It had also 
vowed to maintain current water tariffs for the following two years.  
 
Veolia‟s subsidiary A. Utilities has been running water services in Yerevan, Armenia for five years with 
support from the World Bank‟s Municipal Development Project (MDP). Consultant and whistleblower Bruce 
Tasker has reportedly alleged corruption as substantial amounts of money would have been diverted to 
benefit MDP officials and their cronies. Mr. Tasker‟s allegations refer to the “embezzlement of tens of 
millions of dollars worth of public funds” and practices reducing the effectiveness of operations. For 
example, Mr. Tasker claimed that most of the fifty international specialists contracted by A. Utilities to 
contribute their expertise were ghosts.   
 
In 1999, Veolia (then Vivendi Water) won a 30-year water supply contract with Almaty city government in 
Kazakhstan. This was the first case of private sector participation in water supply in a Former Soviet Union 
country. The new operator was Almaty Sui, a joint venture between Veolia (owning 55% of the shares) and 
GKP Vodokanal (holding the remaining 45 %). 
 
In the region, Berlinwasser has projects in Azerbaijan and Turkey, while RWE and EVN operate a water 
BOT in Zagreb, Croatia.   
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5. Reactions against privatisation: France, Italy, Ireland, UK 
5.1. France 
A coalition including NGO France Liberté, the city councillor association EAU, the green and communist 
parties and consumers association UFC-Que Choisir are promoting remunicipaslisation of water supply and 
sanitation in France. France Liberté are calling for water remunicipalisation to be made a live issue in the  
upcoming March 2008 municipal elections throughout France. UFC-Que Choisir are also favouring 
remunicipalisation in light of a survey carried out by UFC-Que Choisir magazine, which found out that a 
private operations are imposing considerably high water tariffs. The worst case was that of SEDIF, operated 
by Veolia and responsible for water supply operations in the Greater Paris region, which had the highest 
tariff. As a result of pressure from the association EAU and UFC-Que Choisir, the municipality of Montreuil 
(100,000 inhabitants),which is currently served by SEDIF, has started a procedure which might end up in the 
remunicipalisation of water supply. This would be the second largest case of remunicipalisation in France 
after that of Grenoble (150,000).   
 
In November 2007, outgoing Paris mayor Bertrand Delanoë has announced that, if re-elected, he would not 
renew the two affermage contracts to Suez and Veolia to entrust all water operations to a unique municipal 
operator. Miss Anne Le Strat, a green city councillor and CEO of the majority municipally-owned bulk water 
supply company Eau de Paris, welcomed the announcement.. 
5.2. Italy 
Roughly 1/3 of Italian water operations are now deemed to be in the hands of private or public-private 
companies (mainly Italian). Another 1/3 is deemed to be in the hands of public operators and the remainder 
remains to be awarded to either private or public concessionaires. The Italian Forum of Movements on 
Water, an alliance of civil society organisations including trade union CGIL, are taking action to promote 
water supply and sanitation remunicipalisation by adopting a two-pronged strategy. 
 
First, the Forum is raising the profile of water issues through local public campaigns which have culminated 
in a 40,000-strong demonstration in favour of publicly-run water services held in Rome in December 2007. 
Second, the Forum is promoting the adoption of national legislation aiming to stop and revert the 
privatisation of operations and to strengthen public water operations. 
 
In November 2007, the Italian Parliament approved a moratorium promoted by the Italian Forum of 
Movements on Water. The moratorium would suspend all water privatisation processes in Italy for one year. 
The Forum is also promoting a law proposal, backed by the signatures of 406,000 Italian citizens, and which 
is now being considered by the Environmental Commission of the Parliament. The proposed law provides 
for:  
a) public ownership and operation of water services and infrastructure;  
b) exclusion of competition in the water sector due to the priority to be accorded to the public interest from 
the socila and environmental point of view;  
c) remunicipalisation or renationalisation of all private operations;  
d) establishment of a national fund to financially support the renationalisation of water operations;  
e) financing of capital expenditure and part of operating expenditure through general taxation, with the 
remainder to be covered through tariffs;  
f) public participation in the provision of water supply and sanitation services;  
g) establishment of a national solidarity fund, made out of charging a levy of Euro 0.01 per cubic metre of 
water supplied and Euro 0.01 per bottle of water sold. The fund would support Water Operator Partnerships 
(WOPs) and Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs), particularly to promote the extension of water services.      
 
5.3. Ireland and the UK: background 
Water remains a contentious public issue in the Republic of Ireland and in all four parts of the UK, especially 
over privatisation and charges. The Republic of Ireland became an independent state in 1922.  
 
Like other European countries, water services in the UK and Ireland became the responsibility of 
municipalities from the 19th century onwards. Unlike other European countries, however, metering of 
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households has never become established in any of the countries, and so the service has been financed 
through local taxation, or through charges based on property values set for local taxation, rather than 
consumption.   
 
Up to the 1970s, the water services in the Republic of Ireland, England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland, shared a common form – a municipal service funded through local property taxes for households and 
metered charges for businesses. From that decade, a series of changes were made that resulted in different 
structures in terms of ownership and household payments. 
Table 9.  Owners of water operators and basis of payments, UK and Ireland, 1970- 2007 
  1970 1980 1999 2007 
Republic of Ireland Ownership Municipal Municipal Municipal Municipal 
 Household contribution Rates Central tax Central tax Central tax 
England  Ownership Municipal Central govt Private Private 
 Household contribution Rates Rates Rates Rates 
Wales Ownership Municipal Central govt Private Private non-profit 
 Household contribution Rates Rates Rates Rates 
Scotland Ownership Municipal Municipal Municipal Devolved govt corporation 
 Household contribution Rates Rates Rates Rates 
Northern Ireland Ownership Municipal Central govt Central govt Devolved govt corporation 
 Household contribution Rates Rates Rates Rates? 
  
5.4. Republic of Ireland 
In the Republic of Ireland, local property taxes on households (domestic rates) were totally abolished in 
1977. The income previously generated by the rates was replaced by government funding for local council 
services, including water. In the Republic of Ireland therefore municipalities remain responsible for water 
services, but, like other municipal services, these are financed  partly from central government, partly from 
locally collected motor taxes, plus charges for commercial users. 
 
In the 1980s local councils tried to find other sources of revenue for services, and some tried to introduce 
specific water charges for households. But as a result of strong public opposition and a vigorous political 
campaign, these charges were abolished in 1997 (Impact 2004).  This opposition was based mainly on the 
perception that water charges were an unfair way of sharing the costs of the service, whereas funding 
through general taxation is a progressive way of sharing the burden of financing. A recent paper noted: “The 
abolition of domestic water charges in Ireland shows how income distribution issues are ignored at 
one‟s peril.” (Scott 2003)  
 
In addition to funding through taxation, over £600m. of the finance for capital investment in water in Ireland 
has come through the EU cohesion and structural funds. More recently the government has attempted to 
introduce PPPs, with over 100 PPP projects at various stages of development in mid-2006. This too has been 
the subject of strong opposition. (Reeves 2006; SIPTU 2007).  There has been successful opposition to 
various attempts to introduce charges for water, for example in 2006 a proposal for charges for local services 
was withdrawn, and in 2007 a proposal to charge schools for their water use was at least postponed for 2 
years. 17  
5.5. UK 
5.5.1. Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland, responsibility for water services was removed from municipalities in 1973, and 
transferred to a special section of the Northern Ireland Department of the Environment. Around the same 
time, devolved government in Northern Ireland was suspended, and all departments came under direct rule 
by the UK government. The financing however remained unchanged: the government (now through the 
Department for Regional Development (DRD)) continued to collect local property taxes from households to 
finance local services, including water, with metered charges for business users. In 1999 a government paper 
stated that the total expenditure of the water services was£195m., of which over three-quarters was financed 
by the rates, which provided £150m; charges for commercial water use, trade effluent charges and 
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connection charges, provided £36m; and the balance of £9m came from central government. The paper noted 
that: “the contribution this year by the average domestic ratepayer in Northern Ireland for water and 
sewerage services is £127” (DoEe 1999, p.2).  
 
In 2003 the UK government produced a consultation document on reforms to water services in Northern 
Ireland, proposing the introduction of a new charge for water services, additional to the rates paid for local 
services, and presenting a range of options for restructuring the service, including privatisation on the model 
of the English companies. A number of public private partnerships (PPPs) were also created as vehicles for 
capital investment under the private finance initiative, notably for new treatment works. 
 
Three main arguments were used for the new charge: firstly, that people in Northern Ireland did not 
contribute anything towards the cost of the water service; secondly, that EU legislation required that water 
companies should charge users on the basis of „full cost recovery‟; thirdly, that the burden of taxation in 
Northern Ireland is too low compared with the rest of the UK.   
 
The responses to this consultation were overwhelmingly hostile, both to the proposed new charge and to the 
principle of privatisation, and to the claim that no payments were made for water services. This opposition 
came from all sections of the population, with the main unionist and republican parties appearing together on 
campaign platforms to oppose the charge - even a majority of small businesses were opposed to privatisation. 
18 (WRNI 2003a; WRNI 2003b; Hall 2003) By 2006 this opposition was calling for a mass refusal to pay the 
new charge if it was introduced 19.  
 
The UK government nevertheless decided to proceed with the introduction of the new charge and the 
creation of a government owned company – Northern Ireland Water (NIW) - with effect from April 200720.   
NIW was in fact created and came into existence in April 2007, and published a detailed strategic business 
plan for the 7 year period up to 2013/14 (Northern Ireland Water 2007).   
 
This corporatisation, if continued, will itself increase costs significantly. There are extra administrative costs  
of  (a) £54 million per year associated with the company, especially the costs of administering a new charge 
separate from the rates; and (b) £48 million per year in dividends which will have to be paid to the company 
because the UK government has assigned it a notional shareholder capital of £650 million per year – an 
arbitrary figure which could have been zero. The combined effect of the corporatisation alone is to increase 
the total cost of the water service by over 30% (Hall 2007). 
 
However, the implementation of the water charge was suspended as a result of the reintroduction of 
democratic elections in Northern Ireland. Elections for an assembly were held in early 2007, and the 
proposed water charge was a major issue, with all the main parties pledging opposition to the charge. These 
elections were followed by the creation of a Northern Ireland executive in May 2007, including 
representatives of both the main unionist party (the DUP) and the main republican party (Sinn Fein). The UK 
government then transferred to the new executive responsibility for a number of public services, including 
water. At the first meeting of the executive, it decided to suspend water charges for 2007/08 and set up a 
comprehensive review of water services. This review is required to look at two basic questions: “what the 
real cost of providing water and sewerage services is [in Northern Ireland]; and how these costs should be 
met”, and then consider the best arrangements for management and governance of water services within 
public ownership. 21   
5.5.2. Scotland 
In the early 1990s, the government also proposed to privatise water in Scotland, but public opposition there 
was even higher: successive polls showed 91% 22 or 86% 23 of people definitely opposed. In March 1994 
Strathclyde Regional Council, covering nearly half the population of Scotland, organised a postal referendum 
on the issue: seven out of ten  voters returned papers, a total of 1.2 million people, of whom 97% rejected 
water privatisation. 24  The government finally abandoned the attempt to privatise Scottish water, and issued 
an emphatic leaflet at Scottish local elections in May 1994 with the headline “Tories say no to privatisation.” 
25  Public resistance  to water privatisation remains high in Scotland: a poll in 2004 found that 70% are still 
opposed. 26   
 
Water services in Scotland thus remained the responsibility of municipalities until the 1990s, and were then 
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transferred to three area boards. After the creation of a devolved government in Scotland, which took over 
responsibility for water services, the area boards were merged in 2002 into a single corporation, Scottish 
Water, owned by the Scottish Executive. The basis of charging households is the local property tax band, 
with metered charges for commercial consumers. (Cooper et al. 2006)   
 
Following the elections in May 2007, the Scottish National Party now controls the Scottish executive. It has 
ruled out converting Scottish water into a non-profit mutual company.
 27
   The regulator, the Water Industry 
Commission for Scotland, has openly suggested that the necessary investment programme cannot be funded 
through the public sector. 28  
5.5.3. Wales 
Water in Wales was privatised along with the English companies in 1989.  In 2000, the private company was 
taken over by a not-for-profit company, Glas Cymru. This was created not as an act of political reform, but 
as a mechanism devised by a consortium of USA multinational electricity companies who were buying the 
merged electricity and water company covering Wales (Hyder) but did not want to keep the water business. 
No private buyer was interested, so they had to create a vehicle to take it off their hands. It was broadly 
supported by the public and by the Welsh Assembly, but the company is not owned by the public sector, nor 
is it a cooperative, nor a mutual company. It is a not-for-profit company controlled by its directors, who re-
appoint their own successors. It has no shareholders, and all its capital is debt finance, mainly bonds. 
5.5.4. England: fraud and misleading information 
In England and Wales, water services were removed from municipalities in 1974 and transferred to semi-
nationalised Regional Water Authorities (RWAs). The RWAs continued to charge households on the basis of 
the same property values used for municipal rates – the rates bills of municipalities fell accordingly. In 1989 
these were sold as private companies, but the basis of financing remained largely unchanged: even after 
privatisation, the companies charge the majority of households on the basis of property tax valuations, with 
metered charges for commercial users (metered charges are also applied to new houses, where meters are 
routinely installed, and a minority of households who volunteer for metering).   
 
Since 2004 there have been a series of revelations about private companies deliberately deceiving the 
regulator, leading to customer refunds, fines and criminal investigations.  
 
 A Severn Trent manager, David Donnelly, said in 2004 that he had been instructed by his bosses to 
exaggerate  figures of debts owed by non-paying customers. 29 A year and a half later OFWAT 
produced a report which “found that Severn Trent Water had provided regulatory data that was either 
deliberately miscalculated or poorly supported. This led to price limits being set for the water 
company that were higher than necessary, which would have resulted in customers paying £42 
million more by 2009-10.” The company was forced to repay the £42 million. 30  A few months later, 
in June 2006, OFWAT proposed to fine Severn Trent – this has not yet been done, but the possible 
level of the fine has been estimated at £50 million.31  In November 2007 the Serious Fraud Office 
finally announced that it was going to prosecute Severn Trent for three criminal offences in relation 
to misreporting of leakage data. 32 
 Southern Water confessed to having made mistakes about its responses to customers, and failure to 
make payments due to customers. 33  The Serious Fraud Office decided not to prosecute, but OFWAT 
have fined Southern water £20 million – the problems were found to go back to before 2000. Ofwat 
Chief Executive Regina Finn said: "Southern Water deliberately misreported its customer service 
performance to Ofwat and systematically manipulated information to conceal the company's true 
performance over an extended period of time. The company benefited directly from this 
misreporting at the last two price reviews, meaning Southern was able to increase its prices by more 
than it should have done. Customers received higher than necessary bills because of the company's 
deception.” 34  
 Thames Water (then owned by RWE) admitted that they had misrepresented data on its response to 
customer enquiries, which also affects customer bills.  OFWAT propose to fine Thames only £12.5 
million because OFWAT considers that the misreporting was not deliberate. 35  
 Tendring Hundred ( a Veolia company) admitted it had made an “accounting error” in its estimates 
of income from metered customers, and overcharged customers £5 per head as a result of this 
unfortunate mistake. The company was not fined. 36   
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5.5.5. Opposition to water privatisation in England and Wales 
There has never been general support for the privatisation in England (or elsewhere in the UK). Strong 
public opposition to water privatisation was apparent throughout the 1980s.  The first proposals in 1985 were 
widely criticised: even a Financial Times editorial suggested that: “the water industry has many special 
characteristics which seem to justify public ownership” 37. A vigorous campaign against the policy was led 
by the unions, along with “a wide range of different interest groups…[including] some naturally sympathetic 
bodies such as Labour local authorities, but mostly non-political organisations, such as the Countryside 
Commission, the National Farmers' Union, the British Pensioners' Association, Greenpeace, the River 
Thames Society and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.” 38  The  government decided in July 1986 
to postpone the plans, because: “it did not seem a particularly attractive policy to introduce so close to an 
election”. 39  A poll in December 1986 showed that 71% were opposed to water privatisation, and only 21% 
in favour. 40   The opposition partly reflected scepticism about the effects of privatisation, with more than 
half expecting water services to get worse under privatisation, 41 but also a stubborn continuation of a belief 
in the importance of the public sector. A January 1988 poll showed a majority in the UK favouring a "mainly 
socialist society, in which public interests and a controlled economy predominated, and where caring for 
others was more highly rewarded than creation of wealth” 42 ; and a June 1988  poll showed that 40% “felt 
nationalisation gave ordinary people a larger stake in the country” against 35% preferring privatisation. 43 
Water in England and Wales was nevertheless privatised in 1989.  
 
The actual experience of privatisation reinforced the unpopularity of the policy. This view was not confined 
to a particular political perspective. The Daily Mail, a staunch supporter of the Conservative party, ran 
consistently critical coverage, typified by a feature in 1994 entitled „The Great water Robbery‟, which slated 
the companies on all counts: “…. the water  industry has become the biggest rip-off in Britain. Water  bills, 
both to households and industry, have soared. And the directors and shareholders of Britain's top ten water  
companies have been able to use their position as monopoly suppliers to pull off the greatest act of licensed 
robbery in our history ”. 44  
Chart B. Public opposition to water privatisation in Britain, 1986-1993 
Percentage opposed to water privatisation in England and Wales, and Scotland, 1986-1993
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Source:   Opinion polls reported in Financial Times, Guardian, Times, Independent, Scotsman and Herald, 1986-1993.  
 
The public still believes that water should be in the public sector, 17 years after the water companies of 
England and Wales were privatised.  In June 2006, 56% of people in an opinion poll believed that the 
country “would have fewer problems with water supplies if the industry was renationalised and the private 
companies replaced with a government-owned water board”, while 38% disagreed. The results were 
consistent across all age groups and regions (see Annex 1 for detailed results). 45  This poll was taken in the 
context of water shortages, drought orders, restrictions on consumption, high levels of reported leakage, 
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companies reporting increased profits and higher pay for directors, while water prices continue to rise. 
Chart C. Popular support for public ownership of water industry in Britain 2006 
Support for public ownership of water in England and 
Wales, 2006
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Source: BBC Daily Politics Show Poll Fieldwork : June 14th-15th 2006. Conducted by Populus.  
   http://www.populuslimited.com/pdf/2006_06_20_Daily_Politics.pdf  (see Annex) 
 
6. Impact of the EU on the water sector 
6.1. Summary 
The EU affects water sector not only through directives specific to the sector, such as the Water Framework 
Directive, but also through other general policies such as the cohesion funds, the limits on government 
borrowing, and laws related to competition such as the procurement directives. The table below summarises 
the main elements affecting water. 
Table 10.  EU policies and impact on water sector 
Category Instrument Content Public service effect  
Sectoral directives Environment e.g. Groundwater, nitrates + 
 Service levels e.g. Drinking water, wastewater treatment +/- 
 WFD Participation, cost recovery +/- 
    
Economic instruments Cohesion funds Accession, regional + 
 Stability pact Limits borrowing, debt - 
 EIB, EBRD Loan finance for investment +/- 
    
Competition Internal market Competition rules( but no  directive) - 
 State aid Limits conditions of public corporations - 
 Procurement Trend to required tendering - 
 PPPs Encouragment of private partnerships - 
 
6.2. Environmental directives and Water Framework Directive 
The EU has passed a number of directives affecting water. They include general laws on the protection of 
water and water bodies e.g. on groundwater; laws aimed at controlling commercial activities with a strong 
influence on water quality e.g. concerning nitrates; laws directly regulating municipal activities in the water 
and waste water sector e.g. concerning drinking water and wastewater treatment; and an overarching law, the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD).  For a review of all the directives, see 
http://www.watertime.net/docs/WP1/D7_Int_Context_final.pdf 
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The directives on environmental quality and service levels, especially the wastewater treatment directive, 
have required higher levels of investment. Combined with the constraints on public borrowing and debt, this 
has created incentives to use private companies, for example through concessions or PPPs/PFI, to build and 
operate the necessary treatment plants.  
 
The WFD article includes provisions, for example concerning public participation, which are in principle 
beneficial. It also includes provisions on cost recovery (Article 9), saying that member states must “take 
account of the principle of recovery of costs of water services”, and that member states must ensure “by 2010 
that water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water resources efficiently” and “an 
adequate contribution of the different water uses, disaggregated into at least industry, households and  
agriculture, to the recovery of the costs of water services”. But the definition of an adequate contribution is 
left open, and “member states shall not be in breach if they decide in accordance with established practice 
not to apply”  these requirements.  
 
However these provisions are being used to put pressure on countries to increase water charges. In Hungary, 
where major capital investment is still financed from central government, EU officials have indicated that 
they expect central government support to be phased out by 2015. It has been estimated that this will involve 
price rises of 5-85 percent, with large regional differentiation, with Budapest on the top. 46 
 
Article 9 also requires cost recovery to be assessed separately for the three main categories of users – 
households, industries, and agriculture – and so cross-subsidy is implicitly discouraged. Households may in 
fact be suffering worst. The EC report on implementation of the directive in 2007 found that there is more 
attention given to cost recovery from households, and also that the level of cost recovery for households is 
70-100%: higher than for business (40-100%) or agriculture (1-100%).  The effect could therefore be to 
increase household prices faster than others (despite the fact that households consume less than 20% of total 
water abstracted in the EU 15, on average). 
Chart D. Information on cost recovery for water in EU, 2007. 
 
 
Source: SEC(2007) 362 Accompanying document to the Communication From The Commission To The European 
Parliament And The Council 'Towards Sustainable Water Management in the European Union' First stage in the 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC Brussels, 22.3.2007 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/implrep2007/pdf/sec_2007_0362_en.pdf  
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6.3. Cohesion funds 
The EU makes significant financial provision for the costs of investment in water (and other environmental, 
transport and energyinfrastructure) through the various accession, structural and cohesion funds. These are 
significant public finance mechanisms for redistributing money raised through general taxation to countries 
in most need. On average the EU collects about €20 Euros in taxes from every person in the EU each year to 
support investment in water and sanitation alone. 47   
 
During the period 1994 to 1999, environmental investment financed from the Structural Funds amounted to 
over € 9 billion.  The impact on coverage in less wealthy regions and member states was significant:  
 
“In Greece, the number of urban areas connected to main drainage almost doubled between 1993 and 
1999, increasing the population covered to over 70%.  In Ireland, the proportion covered rose from 
44% in 1991 to 80% in 1999.  In Portugal, the population connected to drinkable water supply rose 
from 61% in 1989 to 95% in 1999 and that connected to main drainage from 55% in 1990 to 90% in 
1999.  The Funds also helped to increase water supply in regions with a serious shortage.  In Italy, 
for example, supply was expanded by over a third over the programming period.” 48  
 
Overall, this central support for infrastructure and other measures had a major effect on economic growth; in 
Greece, GDP in 1999 was 9.9% higher than it would have been without the central cohesion funds, in 
Portugal 8.5% higher. 49  
6.4. Stability pact 
The economic and market policies of the EU have had a general restrictive impact on public finances of 
member states and accession countries.  The EU convergence criteria, the so-called “Stability Pact”, agreed 
in 1992, require that members and prospective members of the EU must reduce their general government 
financial deficit (GGFD) to 3% of GDP, and their national debt to 60% of GDP. (EU Consolidated Treaty 
2003: art. 104). This has affected all public services in two ways: firstly, it has encouraged the sale of public 
enterprises as a way of reducing debt; secondly, it has encouraged restructuring which involves private sector 
financing of investments – e.g. through sale of public enterprises, or through the use of „public-private-
partnerships‟ (PPPs), including concessions and the private finance initiative of the UK - and so reclassifies 
debt finance for capital expenditure as non-governmental. This latter effect was especially significant in 
sectors such as water which required major capital investment.   
6.5. Competition rules and internal market  
The competition and internal market provisions of the EU treaty have had the sharpest effect on public 
services, including water. These effects can be considered under three main headings:  liberalisation 
directives; procurement rules, and state aid rules. 
 
6.5.1. No directive, but tried 
There is no directive requiring liberalisation of the water sector, unlike the electricity, gas, post, telecoms, 
and rail sectors which are subject to such rules (and have experienced many problems as a result). When 
Commissioner Bolkestein was in charge of DG Markt he made clear in speeches that he supported 
liberalisation in the water sector, commissioned a report on how competition could be introduced in the 
sector, and the Commission‟s 2003 paper on the strategy for the internal market of the EU for the next three 
years identified water in particular as a sector where the DG wanted to open more of the market to private 
sector operators – but all this pressure failed to convince enough people, and the parliament stated that it did 
not think water was suitable for liberalisation.  
6.5.2. Procurement and PPPs  
The Procurement Directives of the EU are a set of rules requiring public tendering throughout the EU of all 
public authority contracts to purchase goods, building works, or services from the private sector. There are 
two areas of ambiguity surrounding the procurement directives, both of which have a significant 
impact on public and private provision of water services.  
 
The first concerns the position of services which are carried out on behalf of a public authority by an „arms-
length‟ public sector organisation. In many countries, municipalities provide water (and other) services 
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through arms-length companies, which are still 100% owned by the municipality.  Many municipalities have 
joined together and formed inter-municipal associations to enable them to provide water services on a larger  
scale, especially in rural areas. National laws and practice allow all public authorities to decide to carry out 
services themselves, and there is no requirement for services to be tendered if the authority is not outsourcing 
the work to the private sector.  
 
However, private contractors have brought cases arguing that work awarded to an arms-length company or 
an inter-municipal association may not be covered by the exemption for in-house operations, and should be 
treated as an outsourced contract, thus triggering the requirement of the procurement directives for tendering. 
The ECJ case law is extremely complex but some of the decisions have meant that even where a company is 
100% municipally owned, and even when the service is delegated to an inter-municipal company, these may 
be considered to be so arms length as to require prior tendering.50  
 
The second area of uncertainty concerns concessions, which is a common form of contract under which 
water supply and sanitation services are delegated. However, as confirmed by an EC paper in 2001, the 
procurement directives do not cover concessions, and so formal competitive tendering under EC 
procurement rules is not required in respect of such contracts. 33 As a result, concessions in France or Italy 
may be opened to tender under national laws, but are not required to be open to companies from other EU 
countries. 
 
Both of these questions are expected to be reviewed again in the green paper on PPPs due in 2004, along 
with the question of whether to require tendering of activities assigned to companies owned by public 
authorities. 
 
6.5.3. State aid  
The state aid rules of the EU treaty were intended to prevent governments from providing financial support 
for companies that would give them an advantage in competition with other European companies.  
 
Following a landmark judgment by the ECJ in the Altmark case, which set out 4 criteria which would make 
state aid for a public sector operator acceptable, the EC issued a set of guidelines which incorporated these 
Altmark criteria. One of the central problems with these criteria, however, is that they also treat competitive 
tendering as a key process which validates state subsidies. The fourth Altmark criterion – the need to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of the state subsidy – is automatically fulfilled if the service has been 
subjected to competitive tender; if not it has to demonstrate that it is as efficient as a „well-run company‟, 
which is an uncertain requirement. The Altmark rules make competitive tendering even more attractive 
because the procurement process effectively ensures that the first two criteria are met as well:  the definition 
of the public service obligation (condition 1) has to be made as part of a contract specification; the advance 
specification of the calculation of subsidy have to be specified (condition 2) in order to obtain comparable 
tenders. Altmark‟s third condition, concerning proportionality of the aid, may also be most simply 
demonstrated through competitive tendering, arguing that the competitive process will always effectively 
discount any excess and return it to the public authority or to users of the service through lower charges. 51 
6.6. Development banks: EIB and EBRD 
The EIB (European Investment Bank) is the EU‟s financing institution, whose aim is to “contribute towards 
the integration, balanced development and economic and social cohesion of the Member Countries”. Outside 
the EU the EIB implements the financial components of agreements concluded under European development 
aid and cooperation policies. In 2001, EIB lending for environmental projects (including water and 
sanitation), both within and outside the EU, totalled €9bn. Water projects accounted for 29% of total EIB 
lending in environmental projects from 1990 to 2001. The EIB has been used extensively to finance 
investments in water and other infrastructure where the private sector has been involved, for example in 
many PPPs and PFI projects in the UK.  
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has been a significant player in the 
privatisation of water and sanitation in eastern Europe. The Bank was established in 1991 with the aim of 
assisting countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union with the transition to 
market-orientated economies. The EBRD generally pursues the “promotion and optimisation of private 
sector participation”, together with other objectives such as decentralisation, commercialisation and 
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corporatisation of services, development of regulatory structures and environmental improvement. The 
conditionality of EBRD finance “typically” includes private sector involvement and other reforms such as 
decentralisation, commercialisation and corporatisation, cost recovery, tariff reform and creditworthiness 
strengthening (EBRD 1999). The EBRD has financed many of the major water privatisations in CEE, such 
as Sofia, Bulgaria; Budapest, Hungary; Tallinn, Estonia; and Bucharest, Romania.  
 
The EBRD has also acted as a partner shareholder, buying equity stakes in private water companies. The first 
examples of this were the EBRD‟s purchase of Bechtel‟s shares in the private water ventures in Tallinn and 
Sofia. The latest example of this is the investment in November 2007 of €105 million in 10% of the shares of 
Veolia Voda. This is Veolia‟s venture to obtain privatised water business in Russia and CIS countries. 52 
 
The EBRD has also imposed a de facto conditionality of private sector involvement through its Multi-Project 
Facility (MPF) schemes. MPFs are funds set up under an agreement between the Bank and a specific private 
sector company to cover several projects on a wholesale basis, which effectively made use of the loans 
conditional on the involvement of the specific private company. In 1995, the Bank provided Suez-Lyonnaise 
des Eaux with a USD$90m multi-project facility, which in 2000 it extended for a further 3 years, and in 
1997, the Bank issued a similar-sized USD$89.5m MPF to Générale des Eaux (now Veolia). In June 1995, 
just one month before the agreement on the multi-project facility to Lyonnaise des Eaux, Thierry Baudon left 
his post as deputy vice president of the EBRD and joined Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux as managing director, 
international project finance (Hall et al 2004). 
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